Lights failed in Caracas during the January 3 attempt to capture Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro, stirring sharp debate over the power outage’s cause. While early headlines described a “precision cyberattack” as responsible, footage and eyewitness accounts of destruction at several substations introduce a different angle. These images, which show bullet damage, destroyed equipment, and fires, lend weight to claims that physical sabotage played a principal role. This complexity raises broader concerns about how such events are publicly interpreted and the potential repercussions for policy on critical infrastructure security. The variety of evidence now emerging has prompted new discussion among specialists regarding how cyber and kinetic operations interact during high-stakes missions.
Reports about related power failures in Venezuela over previous years rarely suggested such an overt blend of cyber and kinetic attacks. Earlier incidents often centered on infrastructure neglect, grid vulnerability, or isolated cyber events with ambiguous links to physical damage. Unlike this case, prior accounts did not document clear, immediate physical assaults in conjunction with cyber elements. This new development marks a shift, presenting a more coordinated and multifaceted attack strategy that raises questions about the effectiveness of both digital and physical grid defenses in similar scenarios.
Why Did the Cyber Narrative Dominate Headlines?
Media and official statements quickly shaped the initial perception that Operation Absolute Resolve relied mainly on digital disruption. Statements from top officials fueled these reports and suggested cyber forces played a lead role, without providing forensic evidence. Experts caution that attributing the entire outage to cyber operations alone overlooks substantial physical evidence captured at the substations.
What Evidence Shows Physical Damage Was Decisive?
Photographs and videos appearing days after January 3 display visible destruction at government-owned substations, including burnt components and bullet-ridden structures. Civilian watchdogs and electric grid security analysts who reviewed this material argue this damage alone could explain several hours of disrupted power in affected areas. The Venezuelan government attributed the incident to “missiles,” further emphasizing the impact of direct attacks. As Earl Shockley, CEO of INPOWERD, noted after reviewing the images:
“There were obviously pretty large .50-caliber bullet holes in the walls.”
Could Cyber Operations Still Have Played a Role?
While the physical sabotage appears sufficient to down key parts of the grid, specialists believe cyber methods may have assisted – either by blinding defenses or identifying vulnerabilities before the strikes. Cyber techniques could serve to delay restoration, disrupt communications, or mask the timing of kinetic operations. Mark Montgomery, senior cybersecurity expert, described the campaign as integrated:
“It’s possible that cyber was attempted to take down power stations and equipment before the missiles came in.”
Discussions within the electric utilities sector highlight how focusing solely on digital attacks may lead to underappreciation of vulnerabilities that require stronger physical safeguards. Framing the Caracas blackout as a cyber-only event risks skewing future actions and investments. The dual nature of the attack draws attention to the interconnectedness of cyber and kinetic threats in modern conflict, emphasizing the necessity for balanced preparedness across both domains. A more nuanced understanding can drive efforts to patch both digital and physical weaknesses in national grid systems.
